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Abstract
This paper proposes a decision theory for
a symbolic generalization of probability the-
ory (SP). Darwiche and Ginsberg [2, 3] pro-
posed SP to relax the requirement of using
numbers for uncertainty while preserving de-
sirable patterns of Bayesian reasoning. SP
represents uncertainty by symbolic supports
that are ordered partially rather than com-
pletely as in the case of standard probabil-
ity. We show that a preference relation on
acts that satisfies a number of intuitive pos-
tulates is represented by a utility function
whose domain is a set of pairs of supports.
We argue that a subjective interpretation is
as useful and appropriate for SP as it is for
numerical probability. It is useful because the
subjective interpretation provides a basis for
uncertainty elicitation. It is appropriate be-
cause we can provide a decision theory that
explains how preference on acts is based on
support comparison.
1 Introduction
In [2, 3] Darwiche and Ginsberg proposed a theoreti-
cal framework of symbolic probability (SP). The main
idea behind SP is to replace numbers by symbols to ex-
press supports for events. It becomes necessary when
(1) exact and consistent numerical probability cannot
be estimated due to lack of information and (2) princi-
ples of insufficient reasoning (e.g., maximum entropy)
are not appropriate. Being a symbolic counterpart of
numerical probability, SP provides basic operations to
reason with supports. Symbolic probability induces a
partially order on events. It is remarkable that most of
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desirable patterns of inference thought to be unique to
Bayesian reasoning also hold for SP. Moreover, SP is
shown to subsume not only standard probability cal-
culus but also a number of important calculi used in
AI e.g., propositional logic, non-monotonic reasoning,
fuzzy possibility and objection-based reasoning.
An open problem for SP is the formulation of a deci-
sion theory whose role is similar to the von Neumann-
Morgenstern linear utility theory that makes probabil-
ity so useful. The goal of this paper is to address this
problem. We show that a preference relation on acts
in a world described by SP structure could be modeled
by a binary utility function if it satisfies a number of
postulates. The binary utility has been introduced in
[7, 6] and shown to work with non-probabilistic calculi
e.g., possibility theory and consonant belief function.
This paper is structured as follows. In the next sec-
tion, SP is reviewed. In section 3, we present a set
of postulates that lead to a representation theorem.
Comparison with related works is presented in section
4 that is followed by a concluding remark.
We list here a brief glossary of symbols to facilitate
reading this paper. Ω is the set of possible worlds.
Capital letters A,B,C are used for subsets of the pos-
sible world. Lower case letters a, b, c denote acts. X is
the set of prizes that includes the most preferred (♯),
the neutral (♮) and the least preferred (♭) elements. S
is the support set that includes ⊤ as the top and ⊥ as
the bottom. Elements of S are denoted by Greek let-
ters α, β, γ. A support function uses symbol Φ. ≥⊕
denotes a partial order on the support set. ⊲ denotes
a preference relation on acts.
2 Symbolic probability
This section reviews the symbolic probability theory
developed in [2, 3]. SP is motivated by the reality that
information available to an agent is often not enough to
commit her to a precise numerical probability function.
A subjectivist probabilist would argue from Savage’s
position [14] that the probability an agent holds is not
necessarily a product of statistical information; it is
something that could be deduced from her behavior.
In fact, this would be possible if the behavior satisfies
a number of properties (Savage’s axioms). However, it
has been found in numerous studies [5, 10] that human
behavior systematically violates some of Savage’s pos-
tulates. Another motivation of SP is to emulate prop-
erties of Bayesian reasoning. The Bayesian approach
is so successful in AI because it combines many plausi-
ble reasoning patterns with an efficient computational
framework [12].
A probability structure is a tuple< Pr,Ω, [0, 1],+,× >
where Ω is the set of possible worlds1, [0, 1] is the unit
interval and +,× are the arithmetic sum and multi-
plication. A probability function Pr maps the power
set 2Ω into the unit interval that satisfies Pr(∅) = 0,
Pr(Ω) = 1 and Pr(A∪B) = Pr(A)+Pr(B) if A∩B = ∅.
If PrA is the conditional probability function given A
then Pr(A ∩B) = Pr(A)× PrA(B).
SP is structurally similar to numerical probability. A
set S that includes at least two specially designated
elements ⊤ and ⊥ is a called a support set. A state
of belief (or support function) is a function from the
set of events to the support set i.e., Φ : 2Ω → S that
satisfies 4 axioms
(A1) Φ(∅) = ⊥
(A2) Φ(Ω) = ⊤
(A3) Φ(A ∪ B) is a function of Φ(A) and Φ(B) for
A,B ⊆ Ω and A ∩B = ∅
(A4) If A ⊆ B ⊆ C ⊆ Ω and Φ(A) = Φ(C) then
Φ(A) = Φ(B) = Φ(C)
A partial function ⊕ : S × S → S defined according
to axiom A3 i.e., α ⊕ β is defined if there are disjoint
events A,B such that Φ(A) = α and Φ(B) = β and
for such α, β α⊕ β
def
= Φ(A ∪B).
Relation ≥⊕ on S is defined as α≥⊕ β if there is a
support γ such that α = β ⊕ γ. Clearly, ≥⊕ is a
partial order.
Suppose ΦA is the updated belief caused by the accep-
tance of A. An event is called accepted if its support
is ⊤. A number of conditions are imposed on this op-
eration. For events A,B,C,D
(A5) ΦA(B) = ⊤ if Φ(B) = ⊤
(A6) ΦA(B) = Φ(B) if Φ(A) = ⊤
1We can think of Ω in terms of a set of variables
V0, V1, V2, . . . Vk. Each ω ∈ Ω is a tuple< v0, v1, v2, . . . vk >
where vi is a value of variable Vi.
(A7) ΦA∪B(A)≥⊕ Φ(A)
(A8) If ΦC(A) = ΦB∩C(A) then ΦC(B) = ΦA∩C(B)
(A9) For Φ,Φ′ such that Φ(A ∪B) = Φ′(A ∪B) then
ΦA∪B(C)≥⊕ ΦA∪B(D) iff
Φ′A∪B(C)≥⊕ Φ
′
A∪B(D)
(A10) ΦA∪B(A) is a function of Φ(A) and Φ(A ∪B)
An unscaling operator ⊗ is defined by Φ(A ∩ B) =
ΦA(B) ⊗ Φ(A). Φ(A) is interpreted as the support
for the event A. For SP, unlike standard probability,
support of an event is not a function of the support of
its complement.
Darwiche and Ginsberg proved that axioms A1−A10
imply SP structure < Φ,Ω,S,⊕,⊗ > has properties
similar to ones of numerical probability. In particular,
support sum is commutative (α ⊕ β = β ⊕ α), asso-
ciative (α ⊕ (β ⊕ γ) = (α ⊕ β) ⊕ γ) and absorptive
(if α ⊕ β ⊕ γ = α then α ⊕ β = α). Φ(∅) = ⊥ and
Φ(Ω) = ⊤. Support unscaling is commutative and dis-
tributive, α ⊗ β = β ⊗ α, (α ⊗ β) ⊗ γ = α ⊗ (β ⊗ γ).
⊥⊗ α = ⊥, α⊗⊤ = α.
They have shown that with appropriately defined sup-
port domain S, operations ⊕,⊘ and ⊗, SP turns into
calculi extensively used in AI: probability, proposi-
tional logic, fuzzy possibility/Spohn’s disbelief calcu-
lus, non-monotonic logic based on preferential models
and objection-based reasoning.
We conclude this review section with an example of
using SP to represent the Ellsberg paradox [5]. This
example serves a dual purpose. On one hand, it illus-
trates the use of SP for situations that elude standard
probability. On the other hand, it demonstrates that
SP has a subjective interpretation in the same way as
standard probability.
The experiment that Ellsberg has set up is simple. In
an urn there are 90 balls of three colors Red, White
and Black. It is known that 30 balls are red. However
nothing is known about the composition of whites and
blacks except that together they count 60. Bets are
offered to estimate a subject’s personal probabilities of
White and Black. It is found that the subject strictly
prefers a bet on Red (pays $1 if a randomly selected
ball is Red and 0 otherwise) to a bet on White. She
also strictly prefers the bet on Red to a bet on Black.
At the same time, the subject strictly prefers a bet on
White or Black (pays $1 if the ball is either White or
Black, it pays 0 in case the ball is Red) to a bet on Red
or White (pays $1 if the ball is either Red or White
and 0 if it is Black). She also prefers the bet on White
or Black to a bet on Red or Black.
Clearly, no numerical probability (for White and
Black) could be inferred from subject’s behavior. In-
deed, from the preference of the bet on Red to the bet
Event ∅ R W B RW RB WB Ω
Φ ⊥ 1/3 w b rw rb 2/3 ⊤
Table 1: Belief state
on White one should conclude that 1
3
= P (Red) >
P (White). From the preference of the bet on Red
to the bet on Black, one must conclude that 1
3
=
P (Red) > P (Black). These conclusions are not rec-
oncilable with the fact that P (White or Black) = 2
3
.
To make the matter more confused, the first preference
(the bet on Red to the bet on White) and the fourth
preference (bet on White or Black to the bet on Red
and Black) violate Savage’s independence axiom.
We use SP to represent this situation. The set of sym-
bolic supports is S = {⊥, w, b, 1
3
, rw, rb, 2
3
,⊤}. One for
each event. Belief state Φ is defined in table 1, where R
stands for event “ball is Red”, WB stands for “ball is
either White or Black” etc. A partial order  can be
extracted from the subject’s preference on bets. Obvi-
ously, A ∅ and ΩA for any event A. The problem
here is how to infer a relation on supports from the
preference on bets. For example, we know that bet on
Red is preferred to the bet on White. It is also pre-
ferred to the bet on Black. Obviously, the set of prizes
are the same {$1, $0}. So the argument for preference
boils down to comparing supports assigned to events.
Notice that this is a comparison of two pairs of sup-
ports
〈
1
3
, 2
3
〉
and 〈w, rb 〉. In the context of this exam-
ple, it is possible to argue that since $0 is to be ignored,
behind the decision maker choice is her judgment that
support for R is larger than support for W . Thus, we
have Φ(R)≥⊕ Φ(W ) and Φ(R)≥⊕ Φ(B)
2. The pref-
erence of the bet on White or Black to the bet on Red
or Black infers Φ(WB)≥⊕ Φ(RB). Similarly, we have
Φ(WB)≥⊕ Φ(RW ). Here ≥⊕ is a partial order be-
cause, for example, W and B are not comparable, so
are RW and RB3.
2Strictly speaking, order 1
3
≥⊕ w is arrived in two steps.
Given that the agent strictly prefers the bet on Red to the
bet on White, one can add a “bonus” to the latter so that
the agent is indifferent between the original bet on Red
and the bet on White plus the bonus. For example, the
new bet pays $1 if the selected ball is White, otherwise it
gives a chance to roll a die. If the die roll turns 1 (event
O) then the agent gets $1 otherwise nothing. We con-
clude from the indifference Φ(R) = Φ(W ∪ O) = 1
3
. Since
Φ(W∪O)≥⊕ Φ(W ) by definition, we have Φ(R)≥⊕ Φ(W ).
Besides providing a formal explanation of the order, O does
not provide any information relevant to estimation of W
and B. Therefore, such auxiliary symbols will be left out
of analysis.
3This partial order reflects currently available informa-
tion. For example, W and B are not comparable because
subject’s preference between a bet on White and a bet on
Black is not revealed. It is possible and necessary that par-
tial order  is updated when more information arrives.
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Figure 1: Partial support order
The partial order on belief is supported by the fol-
lowing partial order ≥⊕ on supports. α≥⊕ ⊥ and
⊤≥⊕ α for any α ∈ S.
1
3
≥⊕ w and
1
3
≥⊕ b. rw≥⊕
1
3
.
rb≥⊕
1
3
. 2
3
≥⊕ rw and
2
3
≥⊕ rb.
3 Decision making with symbolic
probability
The previous example with the Ellsberg paradox shows
that standard probability does not have monopoly on
subjectivistic interpretation. It is important for SP
because the subjective interpretation opens the pos-
sibility of gaining knowledge about uncertainty from
behavior observation. In this section, we ask a differ-
ent question. Given a description of the world in terms
of SP, can one intelligently make decisions on its basis?
We follow the approach in [7, 8]. The basic idea is to
reduce acts into equivalent acts of simpler structure
that are amenable to the Pareto comparison. Specif-
ically, we assume a SP structure < Φ,Ω,S,⊕,⊗ >.
Following Schmeidler [15] we assume that Ω is con-
structed from two independent variables H (for horse)
and R (for roulette). However, unlike Schmeidler, we
do not require that belief state restricted on R is stan-
dard probability. An H−event (R−event) is a subset
of Ω that is expressible by H (R) only. The inde-
pendence between H and R is satisfied by condition
ΦA(B) = Φ(B) and ΦB(A) = Φ(A) where A is a
H−event and B is a R−event. In the previous ex-
ample, H is Ball and R is Die.
We are interested in preference relation on acts. The
set of acts A is constructed as follows. We start with
a set of prizes X that is finite and includes at least
3 elements: the best element ♯, the neutral ♮ and the
worst element ♭. Intuitively, these elements are repre-
sentative of 3 categories of prizes: gain, neutral and
loss. Each x ∈ X is a constant act. An one-stage act
is formed by assigning a prize xi for each event Ai in
a partition (Ai) of Ω. A two-stage act is formed by
assigning either a constant act (prize) or an one-stage
act for each event in some partition. If a1, a2, . . . ak are
constant or one-stage acts and (Ai)
i=k
i=1 is a partition
of Ω then tuple 〈Ai:ai〉
k
i=1 ∈ A. An act is interpreted
as a contract that rewards the decision maker with ai
when event Ai occurs.
After observation of a non-empty event A, an act is
transformed into an A−act. The conditionalization (|)
of acts is defined recursively as follows. The condition-
alization of a prize x ∈ X is itself (x|A
def
= x). For any
other act: 〈Ai:ai〉
k
i=1 |A
def
= 〈(A ∩Ai):(ai|A)〉
k
i=1 (con-
ditionalization causes readjustment in both events and
rewards of the original act).
Two subsets of A are of special interest. An act
where the events on which rewards are conditioned
are H−events is called H−act. In other words, x ∈ X
is H−act. If ai are H−acts and Ai are H−events for
1 ≤ i ≤ k then 〈Ai:ai〉
k
i=1 is a H−act. An act is
canonical if it has the form 〈G : ♯,N : ♮, L : ♭ 〉 where
(G,N,L) is a partition of Ω. G is called the best, N -
the neutral and L - the worst events of the act.
We consider a collection of preference relations
{⊲A such that A is an H-event} (reads “at least as
preferred as given A”). When we talk about a generic
relation in the collection, the subscript is omitted. In
terms of this relation, the meaning of ♯ and ♭ is that
for all x ∈ X, ♯ ⊲ x and x ⊲ ♭. What properties do we
want for the preference relation?
The first property we desire for ⊲ is transitivity i.e.,
for a1, a2, a3 ∈ A if a1 ⊲ a2 and a2 ⊲ a3 then a1 ⊲ a3.
The transitivity ensures basic consistency in subject’s
behavior. We use symbol a ⊲⊳ a′ (reads equivalent) for
a ⊲ a′ and a′ ⊲ a.
Another property often imposed on a preference rela-
tion is completeness i.e., for any acts a1, a2 ∈ A deci-
sion maker can decide whether a1⊲a2 or a2⊲a1. For ex-
ample, in linear utility theory, the comparison between
two acts reduces to comparing their expected utilities
(real numbers). However, here we are dealing with the
situations when one is not always able to compare sup-
ports of events. Is it reasonable to require one to be
resolute in choosing acts despite having vague beliefs?
We argue that such a requirement would go against
the basic tenet of the probabilistic subjectivism: be-
lief in events is inferred from behavior. For example,
let us consider two incomparable events A and B i.e.,
Φ(A) 6≥⊕ Φ(B) and Φ(B) 6≥⊕ Φ(A). We consider two
acts. One pays $1 if A occurs and 0 otherwise. The
other pays $1 if B and 0 otherwise. Because we can
see no rationale to justify definite choice between those
bets, therefore, the most natural course would be to
let them be incomparable. It is crucial to retain the
ability to infer order on supports (e.g., Φ(A)≥⊕ Φ(B))
from preference on bets (e.g., bet on A over the bet on
B). In sum, we will not require the completeness for
⊲ on A.
Between preference relations we assume a condition
that imposes consistency. Suppose ai ⊲⊳Ai bi for
i = 1, 2, . . .m then 〈Ai:ai〉 ⊲⊳Ω 〈Ai:bi〉. Basically, if
ai is equivalent to bi given Ai, then two acts are sub-
stitutable under the assumption that Ai occurs.
Next we consider a requirement that establishes equiv-
alence (⊲⊳) between different acts. Let us consider, as
an example, a two-stage act a1 =
〈
A:a11, A:a12
〉
. It
means if A occurs one gets act a11. If A does not
occur then one gets act a12. Act a11 =
〈
B:x1, B:x2
〉
delivers x1 if B occurs and x2 if B does not. Act a12 =〈
C:x1, C:x2
〉
delivers x1 if C occurs and x2 if C does
not. By collapsing two stages into one, we have a new
act a2 =
〈
D:x1, D:x2
〉
where D = (A∩B)∪(A∩C). a2
delivers x1 if D and x2 if D. We require that a1 ⊲⊳Ω a2.
In order to relate prizes to supports, we require that
given the acceptance of an H−event A, each prize
x ∈ X is equivalent to a R−canonical act i.e., x ⊲⊳A
〈Gx : ♯,Nx : ♮, Lx : ♭ 〉 where Gx, Nx, Lx areR−events.
Notice that because of independence between H and
R, the triplet does not depends on A. By the same
reason, conditional supports ΦA(Gx), ΦA(Nx) and
ΦA(Lx) are invariant wrt A.
Finally, we postulate a fundamental connection be-
tween support and choice: comparing two canoni-
cal acts, decision maker (1) prefers one whose best
event is more supported and whose worst event is
less supported; (2) ignores the neutral events of both
acts. Formally, 〈A1:♯, A2:♮, A2:♭〉 ⊲A 〈B1:♯, B2:♮, B2:♭〉
iff Φ(A1)≥⊕ Φ(B1) and Φ(B3)≥⊕ Φ(A3). This Pare-
tian argument formalizes intuitive notion that people
desire gain, avoid loss and do not care about things
that have no effect on their utility. The linear util-
ity theory exhibits an analogous behavior. The partial
derivative of expected utility on event probability is
the utility of reward obtained in case of the event. The
probability assigned to the event leading to zero util-
ity does not contribute to the expected utility. Prob-
abilities of events leading to positive (negative) utility
positively (negatively) affect the expected utility.
Formally, we assume that {⊲A} satisfy the following
postulates that are similar to ones used by Luce and
Raiffa [11] for linear utility theory.
D1 ⊲A is a partial order on A for any A ⊆ Ω.
D2 Suppose ai = 〈Bij :xj〉
m
j=1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, (Ai)
n
i=1
is a partition of A then 〈Ai:ai〉
n
i=1 ⊲⊳A 〈Cj :xj〉
m
j=1
where
Cj = ∪
n
i=1(Ai ∩Bij) (1)
D3 For each x ∈ X and a non-empty H−event
A there exists a R−triplet partition of Ω:
(Gx, Nx, Lx) such that x ⊲⊳A 〈Gx:♯,Nx:♮, Lx:♭〉.
D4 If (Ai)
n
i=1 is a partition of A and a
′
i ⊲⊳Ai ai for
1 ≤ i ≤ n then 〈Ai:ai〉
n
i=1 ⊲⊳A 〈Ai:a
′
i〉
n
i=1.
D5 〈G : ♯,N : ♮, L : ♭ 〉 ⊲C 〈G
′ : ♯,N ′ : ♮, L′ : ♭ 〉 iff
ΦC(G)≥⊕ ΦC(G
′) and ΦC(L
′)≥⊕ ΦC(L)
A desirable property for a preference relation is the
uniformity with respect to support values [9]. Rela-
tion ⊲A is uniform if it satisfies the following condi-
tion. For partitions (Ai)
m
i=1 and (Bi)
m
i=1 of A such
that ΦA(Ai) = ΦA(Bi), 〈Ai:xi〉
m
i=1 ⊲⊳A 〈Bi:xi〉
m
i=1 for
xi ∈ X. This condition simply says that the compo-
sitions of events do not matter. What does matter
is the supports attached to those events. An impli-
cation is that we can abstract away the events of an
act and replace them with support values. We use no-
tation [φi:xi]
m
i=1 for the class of acts 〈Ai:xi〉
m
i=1 such
that Φ(Ai) = φi for i = 1, 2, . . .m. Such a class of
acts is called a lottery. Postulate D5 allows us to
simplify further notation for canonical lotteries. Since
the supports of the neutral events of canonical lot-
teries do not affect the preference they can be left
out. [Φ(G):♯,Φ(N):♮,Φ(L):♭] is abbreviated by a pair
of supports 〈Φ(G),Φ(L) 〉.
Theorem 1 Let C be a H−event and (Ai)
m
i=1 and
(Bi)
m
i=1 be two H−partitions of C such that ΦC(Ai) =
ΦC(Bi). If collection {⊲A} satisfies postulates D1−D5
then 〈Ai:xi〉
m
i=1 ⊲⊳C 〈Bi:xi〉
m
i=1.
Proof: We name the acts in question by dA and dB
respectively. By D3, we have xi ⊲⊳Ai ai and xi ⊲⊳Bi ai
where ai = 〈Gi : ♯,Ni : ♮, Li : ♭ 〉 for i = 1, 2, . . .m.
Also by D3 we have ΦAi(Gi) = ΦBi(Gi), ΦAi(Ni) =
ΦBi(Ni) and ΦAi(Li) = ΦBi(Li). By D4, we can sub-
stitute ai for xi in dA and dB to get d
′
A and d
′
B . By
D2, we can collapse d′A and d
′
B to get d
′′
A and d
′′
B . d
′′
A
is a canonical act 〈GA : ♯,NA : ♮, LA : ♭ 〉 and d
′′
B is a
canonical act 〈GB : ♯,NB : ♮, LB : ♭ 〉 where
GA = ∪
m
i=1(Ai ∩Gi), GB = ∪
m
i=1(Bi ∩Gi)
LA = ∪
m
i=1(Ai ∩ Li), LB = ∪
m
i=1(Bi ∩ Li)
We calculate the supports for GA and GB :
ΦC(GA) = ⊕
m
i=1(ΦC(Ai)⊗ ΦAi(Gi))
ΦC(GB) = ⊕
m
i=1(ΦC(Bi)⊗ ΦBi(Gi))
We have ΦC(Ai) = ΦC(Bi) by the theorem condi-
tions and ΦAi(Gi) = ΦBi(Gi) by postulate D3. Thus,
ΦC(GA) = ΦC(GB). Similarly, we can show that
ΦC(LA) = ΦC(LB). By D5, we have d
′′
A ⊲⊳C d
′′
B . Since
dA ⊲⊳C d
′
A ⊲⊳C d
′′
A and dB ⊲⊳C d
′
B ⊲⊳C d
′′
B , by D1 we
conclude dA ⊲⊳C dB .
Theorem 2 Suppose 〈Ai:ai〉
m
i=1 is a H−act (i.e., (Ai)
is a H−partition of A and ai are H−acts), then there
is a triplet partition (G,N,L) such that 〈Ai:ai〉
m
i=1 ⊲⊳A
〈G : ♯,N : ♮, L : ♭ 〉.
Proof: The technique used in the previous proof can
also be used here. We sketch a proof by induction on
the depth of the act. The induction hypothesis is that
there exist canonical acts such that
ai ⊲⊳Ai 〈Gi : ♯,Ni : ♮, Li : ♭ 〉 for i = 1, 2, . . .m
If ai are prizes the hypothesis holds because ofD3. As-
sume that it holds for acts of depth less than n where
n is the depth of the act in question. We substitute the
canonical acts for ai by D4, then collapse the newly
formed act by D2 to obtain 〈G : ♯,N : ♮, L : ♭ 〉 where
G = ∪mi=1(Ai ∩Gi) (2)
N = ∪mi=1(Ai ∩Ni) (3)
L = ∪mi=1(Ai ∩ Li) (4)
The transitivity (D1) of ⊲ will conclude the proof.
This theorem clearly outlines a strategy for deciding
between two acts: (1) reduce an act into canonical
form; (2) compare the equivalent canonical acts on the
basis of D5. We need some notation. By D3, for
x ∈ X, x ⊲⊳A 〈Gx : ♯,Nx : ♮, Lx : ♭ 〉. Let us define two
functions α, β from X to S by
α(x) 7→ ΦA(Gx) and β(x) 7→ ΦA(Lx) (5)
In particular α(♯) = ⊤, β(♯) = ⊥, α(♮) = ⊥, β(♮) = ⊥,
α(♭) = ⊥, β(♭) = ⊤ because G♯ = N♮ = L♭ = Ω and
N♯ = L♯ = G♮ = L♮ = G♭ = N♭ = ∅.
We overload symbols ⊕ and ⊗ as follows. Suppose
α, β, γ, β′, γ′ ∈ S
α⊗ 〈β, γ 〉
def
= 〈α⊗ β, α⊗ γ 〉
〈β, γ 〉 ⊕ 〈β′, γ′ 〉
def
= 〈β ⊕ β′, γ ⊕ γ′ 〉
Operations on the left hand side are defined from the
support sum and unscaling operations on the right
hand side. Thus, they are defined whenever the corre-
sponding support operations are defined. We have the
following corollary.
Corollary 1 Suppose (Ai)
m
i=1 is a H−partition of A
and ΦA(Ai) = φi
[φi:xi]
m
i=i ⊲⊳A ⊕
m
i=1(φi ⊗ 〈α(xi), β(xi) 〉) (6)
Note that the calculation on the right hand side of
eq. 6 is well defined because this process is nothing but
calculating the supports for events of the canonical act
guaranteed by theorem 2. We can define a set
U
def
= {〈α, β 〉 |∃A,B,A ∩B = ∅,Φ(A) = α,Φ(B) = β}
with order≥U defined as 〈α, β 〉 ≥U 〈α
′, β′ 〉 iff α≥⊕ α
′
and β′ ≥⊕ β. A function u : A → U is defined by
u(〈Ai:xi〉
m
i=i) 7→ ⊕
m
i=1(ΦA(Ai)⊗ 〈α(xi), β(xi) 〉) (7)
u can be seen as a utility function where the utility
range is U . Since each utility is a pair of two compo-
nents, we call the utility binary. We refer to the left
(right) component of a binary utility as its gain (loss)
component.
It is not difficult to verify that for canonical acts
u(〈G : ♯,N : ♮, L : ♭ 〉) = 〈Φ(G),Φ(L) 〉. Because of
eq. 5 for prize x, u(x) = 〈α(x), β(x) 〉. In particu-
lar, u(♯) = 〈⊤,⊥〉, u(♮) = 〈⊥,⊥〉 and u(♭) = 〈⊥,⊤〉.
Given that eq. 7 becomes
u(〈Ai:xi〉
m
i=i) 7→ ⊕
m
i=1(ΦA(Ai)⊗ u(xi)) (8)
We conclude this section with an illustration of SP
solution for the Ellsberg paradox. The acts considered
in the example involves a minimal set of prizes. X
consists of just 3 elements ♯, ♮ and ♭. Betred that
pays $1 if the ball is Red and nothing otherwise is
coded as 〈R : ♯, BW : ♮, ∅ : ♭ 〉. Betwhite is coded as
〈W : ♯, RB : ♮, ∅ : ♭ 〉.
u(Betred) =


Φ(R)⊗ 〈⊤,⊥〉 ⊕
Φ(WB)⊗ 〈⊥,⊥〉 ⊕
Φ(∅)⊗ 〈⊥,⊤〉
=


1
3
⊗ 〈⊤,⊥〉 ⊕
2
3
⊗ 〈⊥,⊥〉 ⊕
⊥⊗ 〈⊥,⊤〉
=
〈
1
3
,⊥
〉
Similarly, we calculate u(Betwhite) = 〈w,⊥〉. Since
1
3
≥⊕ w, we have u(Betred) ≥U u(Betwhite).
4 Related works
Qualitative decision making has been getting attention
of researchers in recent years out of concern that reli-
able probability may not practically available. Dubois
and Prade [4] studied a framework for decision mak-
ing based on possibility theory. Brafman and Tennen-
holtz [1] provided an axiomatic characterization of fre-
quently used qualitative decision criteria namely max-
imin, minimax regret and competitive ratio.
This work continues the development of our previous
works on decision making with various forms of non-
probabilistic uncertainty calculi [6, 8]. The basic idea
is to reduce acts of complex structure into ones of sim-
pler structure (canonical) that are amenable to the
Pareto comparison. This approach exploits the dual-
ity between belief and preference. A comparison with
Dubois and Prade’s approach [4] is given in [7]. While
qualitative decision criteria such as maximin, minimax
regret and competitive ratio ignore uncertainty by fo-
cusing on worst-case performance, our approach make
use of this information in making decision.
It can be shown that when SP becomes possibility cal-
culus (S is the real unit interval, ⊕ is max and ⊗
is min) this proposal is more flexible than one in [7].
In the latter preference relation was required to be
complete whereas in this proposal it could be partial.
However, if we require Nx = ∅ for x ∈ X, the utility
function defined in eq. 8 becomes the binary utility
function for possibility [7].
When SP becomes standard probability (S is [0, 1], X
is [0, 1], ⊕ is +, and ⊗ is ×) we can show that util-
ity function defined in eq. 7 is equivalent to standard
expected utility. We set u(x) = 〈x, 1− x 〉 (this also
means Nx = ∅). Therefore, 〈α, 1− α 〉 ≥U 〈α
′, 1− α′ 〉
iff α ≥ α′. Eq. 8 becomes
u(〈Ai:xi〉
m
i=i) =
m∑
i=1
(p(Ai)× 〈xi, 1− xi 〉)
=
〈
m∑
i=1
p(Ai)xi,
m∑
i=1
p(Ai)(1− xi)
〉
=
〈
m∑
i=1
p(Ai)xi, (1−
m∑
i=1
p(Ai)xi)
〉
The gain component of binary utility is the same as
standard expected utility. Because, in this case, gain
and loss components are complementary, order on bi-
nary utilities is the same as order on their gain compo-
nents. Therefore, the binary utility function is equiv-
alent to the expected utility function.
Partial orders of belief and the issues of decision mak-
ing have been considered by a number of authors. We
examine in this section two of the more prominent pro-
posals. Halpern [9] considers plausibility measures4.
Plausibility function Pl is a function from 2Ω → D
where D is the set of plausibility values. D is par-
tially ordered by ≥D (transitive, reflexive and anti-
symmetric). ⊤ and ⊥ are top and bottom elements of
D. Pl is assumed to satisfy 3 properties Pl(∅) = ⊥,
Pl(Ω) = ⊤ and Pl(A) ≥D Pl(B) if A ⊇ B. He
shows that a set of standard probability functions P
can be formulated as a plausibility measure by tak-
ing plausibility range DP
def
= {f : P → [0, 1]} -
the set of function from P to unit interval. Par-
tial order on DP is defined as pointwise ordering i.e.,
4Halpern’s notion of plausibility measure is more gen-
eral than Dempster-Shafer plausibility functions.
f ≥ g iff f(P ) ≥ g(P ) ∀P ∈ P. Plausibility mea-
sure is defined as Pl(A) 7→ fA where fA is defined as
fA(P ) = P (A) for P ∈ P. For example, the Ellsberg
example is represented by a set of probability func-
tions {Pa|0 ≤ a ≤
2
3
} with the understanding that
Pa(W ) = a. Thus, Pl(R) = fred where fred(Pa) =
1
3
,
Pl(W ) = fwhite where fwhite(Pa) = a for 0 ≤ a ≤
2
3
and Pl(B) = fblack where fblack(Pa) =
2
3
−a. This rep-
resentation can be viewed as a SP structure with (1)
set of support S = DP , (2) ≥⊕ =≥D, (3) operations
⊕,⊗,⊘ are pointwise addition, multiplication and di-
vision respectively. Notice that in Halpern’s represen-
tation, unlike our, fred 6≥D fwhite and fred 6≥D fblack.
To make decision with plausibility, Halpern defines an
expectation domain which is a tuple (D1, D2, D3,⊕,⊗)
whereD1 is the plausibility range, D2 is the prize value
range and D3 is the valuation domain. ⊗ : D1×D2 →
D3 and ⊕ : D3 × D3 → D3. d1 ⊗ d2 is the valuation
of having a value d2 with plausibility d1. d3 ⊕ d
′
3 is
the valuation of owning two valuations d3 and d
′
3. In
particular, D1 = DP , D2 is the set of constant func-
tions from P to R - the set of reals. D3 is the set of
functions from P to R. ⊕ is pointwise addition and ⊗
is pointwise multiplication. The expectation of an act
is defined as
EPl(〈Ai:xi〉
m
i=1)
def
= ⊕mi=1(Pl(Ai)⊗ xi) (9)
The similarity between the expectation expression
(eq. 9) and binary utility (eq. 8) is obvious. The ex-
pectation maps acts into valuation domain D3. So
the comparison of acts reduces to comparison of their
valuations. Since valuation domain D3 has no obvi-
ous order (in particular, it is a set of functions DP), a
decision maker must provide an order through a mech-
anism called a decision rule. In the case of P, there are
several options for the decision rule: (1) d3 ≥1 d
′
3 iff
inf(d3) ≥ inf(d
′
3); (2) d3 ≥2 d
′
3 iff sup(d3) ≥ sup(d
′
3);
(3) d3 ≥3 d
′
3 iff inf(d3) ≥ sup(d
′
3); and (4) d3 ≥4 d
′
3
iff d3(P ) ≥ d
′
3(P )) for all P ∈ P. Notice that among
4 rules, only ≥1 is compatible with the preference ob-
served in the Ellsberg example i.e., 〈R:♯, BW :♮〉 ≥1
〈W :♯, RB:♮〉 and 〈R:♯, BW :♮〉 ≥1 〈B:♯, RW :♮〉. But
this rule also forces some preferences which are not
observed, for example, 〈RW :♯, B:♮〉 =1 〈R:♯,WB:♮〉.
Although our postulate D5 could be viewed as a de-
cision rule. Its justification would be impossible with-
out interpretation based on the supports of the best
and the worst events of canonical acts. In Halpern’s
approach, the flexibility offered by including decision
rules and expectation domain into decision making
process is gained at the cost of divorcing belief struc-
ture from preference observation. For example, Pl(R)
and Pl(W ) are not comparable while the bet on Red
is definitely preferred to the bet on White. Operations
⊕,⊗ of the expectation domain are independent from
the operations on belief. In contrast, our approach is
based on the duality of belief and choice preference
where the operations for utility are the same as the
operations on belief.
Schmeidler [15] and Sarin & Wakker [13] developed a
decision theory on the basis of Choquet expected util-
ity. Their works extend Savage’s approach [14]. They
show that the satisfaction of a number of postulates
by preference on acts leads to the existence of a non-
additive (subjective) measure of uncertainty called ca-
pacity. Essentially, a capacity function is a Halpern
plausibility measure whose range is the unit interval.
Schmeidler [15] considers a set-up in which acts have
two stages. In the first stage, uncertainties of events
are capacity and rewards are probabilistic acts whose
events have standard (additive) probabilities. Sarin
and Wakker [13] consider one-stage acts. The set of
events on which the acts are formed is required to con-
tain a subset of unambiguous events. On this subset,
capacity is standard probability.
Let us assume that prizes are real numbers interpreted
as utility. Prize order is x1 ≥ x2 ≥ . . . ≥ xm. Un-
certainty is represented by capacity function v. The
Choquet expected utility (CEU) of acts is defined as
CEU(〈Ai:xi〉
m
i=1) =
m∑
i=1
xi(vi − vi−1) (10)
where v0 = v(∅) = 0 and vi = v(A1 ∪A2 . . . ∪Ai).
This approach upholds the principle of subjectivism
that allows inferring belief from the subject’s prefer-
ence. For example, preference of the bet on Red to the
bet on White implies that the capacity of White is a
number less than 1
3
. To account for violations of Sav-
age’s axioms, capacity measure is allowed to be non-
additive i.e., for A ∩ B = ∅, v(A) + v(B) 6= v(A ∪ B).
In particular, v(A) + v(A) 6= 1. Since addition (+)
does not apply for capacity, the only benefit (also the
goal) of using reals is to retain multiplication (×) for
uncertainty-utility combination.
To see the difference between the binary utility and
CEU, let us assume, for the sake of comparison, ♯ =
1, ♮ = 0, ♭ = −1 and S = [0, 1]. With capacity v
CEU of 〈G : ♯,N : ♮, L : ♭ 〉 is v(G)+ v(GN)− 1. With
support function Φ, binary utility of the same act is
〈Φ(G),Φ(L) 〉. It can be shown that in a special case
when support and capacity are identical (Φ = v) and
are additive (standard probability), binary utility and
Choquet utility are equivalent. Normally, they will
induce different orderings. Note also that capacity of L
does not affect CEU (capacity is not additive therefore
v(L) 6= 1 − v(GN)). This insensitivity to uncertainty
of losses could be a practical problem of using CEU.
Since capacity as well as CEU values are reals, orders
on belief and on utility are complete. This implies
that a subject is not allowed to be indecisive, which is
not the case for our approach with SP. Another issue
is that Schmeidler’s two-stage approach and Sarin and
Wakker’s one-stage approach are irreconcilable [13]. In
our model, two-stage and one-stage views are equiva-
lent due to postulateD2. From computational point of
view, capacity, as a measure of uncertainty, is probably
less useful because it is not clear if and how condition-
alization operation could be defined.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate decision making with
the symbolic generalization of probability proposed by
Darwiche and Ginsberg to relax the commitment to
numerical values while preserving desirable properties
of the Bayesian approach. If we assume that the pref-
erence relation on acts satisfies a number of postulates
then it is represented by a utility function whose range
is a set of pairs of symbols in the support domain. Two
components of binary utility can be thought of as the
supports attached to the best and the worst events of
a canonical act. This interpretation is useful to jus-
tify utility order. The higher the gain component and
the lower the loss component the better. The binary
utility function has the same structure as the expected
utility function. This work provides a subjective inter-
pretation for SP. It does not answer, however, a reverse
question what behavior characterizes the SP structure.
We are investigating applications of these techniques
to the domain of medical diagnosis where the chal-
lenge in exact numeric knowledge elicitation is well
known. In such scenarios, we believe that our tech-
nique can be used to elicit preferences from physicians
based on choices they make regarding diagnostic tests
or therapeutic procedures, and use these preferences
to construct a consistent decision making framework.
Moreover, such a framework may be arrived at using
expert physicians at research institutions, and then
can be used as a diagnostic aid for other physicians.
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